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This paper provides a theoretical analysis of optimal minimum wage policy in a perfectly competitive
labor market. We show that a binding minimum wage -- while leading to unemployment -- is nevertheless
desirable if the government values redistribution toward low wage workers and if unemployment induced
by the minimum wage hits the lowest surplus workers first. This result remains true in the presence
of optimal nonlinear taxes and transfers. In that context, a minimum wage effectively rations the low
skilled labor that is subsidized by the optimal tax/transfer system, and improves upon the second-best
tax/transfer optimum. When labor supply responses are along the extensive margin, a minimum wage
and low skill work subsidies are complementary policies; therefore, the co-existence of a minimum
wage with a positive tax rate for low skill work is always (second-best) Pareto inefficient. We derive
formulas for the optimal minimum wage (with and without optimal taxes) as a function of labor supply















The minimum wage is a widely used but controversial policy tool. Although a potentially
useful tool for redistribution because it increases low skilled workers’ wages at the expense
of other factors of production (such as higher skilled workers or capital), it may also lead to
involuntary unemployment, thereby worsening the welfare of workers who lose their jobs. An
enormous empirical literature has studied the extent to which the minimum wage aﬀects the
wages and employment of low skilled workers.1 The normative literature on the minimum
wage, however, is much less extensive.
This paper provides a normative analysis of optimal minimum wage in a conventional
competitive labor market model, using the standard social welfare framework adopted in the
optimal tax theory literature following the seminal contributions of Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971) and Mirrlees (1971). In most of our analysis, we adopt the important “eﬃcient ra-
tioning” assumption – that unemployment induced by the minimum wage hits workers with
the lowest surplus ﬁrst.2 Our goal is to use this framework to illuminate the trade-oﬀs in-
volved when a government sets a minimum wage, and to shed light on the appropriateness of
a minimum wage in the presence of optimal taxes and transfers.
The ﬁrst part of the paper considers a competitive labor market with no taxes/transfers.
Although unrealistic, this case illustrates the key trade-oﬀ when choosing a minimum wage
rate.3 We show that a binding minimum wage is desirable as long as the government places a
non-zero value on redistribution from high- to low-wage workers, the demand elasticity of low
skilled labor is ﬁnite, and the supply elasticity of low skilled labor is positive. Unsurprisingly,
the resulting optimal minimum wage is decreasing in the demand elasticity because a minimum
wage has larger unemployment eﬀects when the demand elasticity is higher. The optimal
minimum wage is increasing in the supply elasticity because a high supply elasticity implies
that marginal workers have a low surplus from working (since many would leave the labor
force if the wages were slightly reduced). The size of the optimal minimum wage follows an
1See e.g., Brown et al. (1982), Card and Krueger (1995), Dolado et al. (1996), Brown (1999), or Neumark
and Wascher (2006) for extensive surveys.
2Although we believe that eﬃcient rationing is the most natural assumption, we also discuss in detail how our
results are modiﬁed if unemployment hits low skilled workers independently of surplus, what we call “uniform
rationing”.
3Although simple, this analysis does not seem to have been formally derived in the previous literature.
1inverted U-shape with the degree of the government’s redistributive tastes: there is no role for
the minimum wage if the government neither values redistribution nor has extreme Rawlsian
preferences (as the costs of involuntary unemployment dominate the value of transfers to low
skilled workers).
The second part of the paper considers how the results change when the government
also uses taxes and transfers to achieve redistributive goals. As described below, our key
innovation is to abstract from the hours of work decision and focus only on the job choice and
work participation decisions. In that context, the government observes only occupation choices
and corresponding wages, but not the utility work costs incurred by individuals. Therefore,
the informational constraints the government faces when imposing a minimum wage policy
and a nonlinear tax/transfer system are well deﬁned and mutually consistent. In such a
model, we show that a minimum wage is desirable if rationing is eﬃcient and the government
values redistribution toward low skilled workers. This result can be seen as an application
of the Guesnerie (1981) and Guesnerie and Roberts (1984) theory of quantity controls in
second best economies: when the government values redistribution toward low skilled workers,
the optimal tax/transfer system over-encourages the supply of low skilled labor. In that
context, a minimum wage eﬀectively rations over-supplied low skilled labor, which is socially
desirable. In other words, if the minimum wage rations low skilled jobs, the government can
increase redistribution toward those workers without inducing any adverse supply response.
Theoretically, the minimum wage under eﬃcient rationing sorts individuals into employment
and unemployment based on their unobservable cost of work. Thus, the minimum wage
partially reveals costs of work in a way that tax/transfer systems cannot.4
When labor supply responses are along the participation margin, we show that a minimum
wage should always be associated with work subsidies (such as the US Earned Income Tax
Credit). Consequently, imposing positive tax rates on the earnings of minimum wage workers
is second-best Pareto ineﬃcient: cutting taxes on low income workers while reducing the (pre-
tax) minimum wage leads to a Pareto improvement. This result remains true even if rationing
is ineﬃcient and could be widely applied in many OECD countries with signiﬁcant minimum
wages and high tax rates on low skilled work.
4Unsurprisingly, we show that if rationing is uniform (and hence does not reveal anything on costs of work),
then the minimum wage cannot improve upon the optimal tax/transfer allocation.
2We derive formulas for the jointly optimal tax/transfer system and minimum wage. The
formulas, as well as numerical simulations, show that – as in the basic case without taxes and
transfers – the optimal minimum wage with optimal taxes is again decreasing in the demand
elasticity for low skilled work, increasing in the supply elasticity for low skilled work, and it
follows an inverted U-shape pattern with respect to the strength of redistributive tastes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the
existing literature most relevant to our analysis. Section 3 presents the basic two-skill model
with extensive labor supply responses and analyzes optimal minimum wage policy with no
taxes. Section 4 introduces taxes and transfers and analyzes jointly optimal minimum wage
policy and taxes/transfers. Section 5 presents illustrative numerical simulations. Section 6
brieﬂy concludes. Formal technical proofs of our propositions are presented in Appendix A,
while Appendix B contains several extensions such as “uniform rationing” and more general
labor supply responses.
2 Existing Literature
That a large demand elasticity for low skilled workers implies a large negative employment
eﬀect of minimum wage will be large has been recognized for a long time (see e.g. Pigou, 1920
and Stigler, 1946). A well-known related point is that, if the absolute value of the demand
elasticity is greater than one, the minimum wage reduces the total pay to low skilled workers
(see e.g. Freeman, 1996; Dolado, Felgueroso, and Jimeno, 2000). In contrast, our analysis
reveals no special signiﬁcance to the absolute demand elasticity being one, but highlights the
importance of labor supply elasticities. We can divide the recent normative literature the
minimum wage into two strands.
The ﬁrst, most closely associated with labor economics, focuses on eﬃciency eﬀects of the
minimum wage in the presence of labor market imperfections. It is well known, at least since
Robinson (1933), that if the labor market is monopsonistic, a minimum wage can increase both
employment and low skilled wages therefore improving eﬃciency (see e.g., Card and Krueger,
1995 or Manning, 2003 for recent expositions). A number of papers have shown that the
monopsony logic for the desirability of the minimum wage extends to other models of the labor
market with frictions or informational asymmetries such as eﬃciency wages (Drazen, 1986,
3Jones, 1987, Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995), bargaining models (Cahuc, Zylberberg, and Saint-
Martin, 2001), signalling models (Lang, 1987), search models (Swinnerton, 1996, Acemoglu
2001, Flinn, 2006), Keynesian macro models (Foellmi and Zweimuller, 2007), or endogenous
growth models (Cahuc and Michel, 1996). These studies focus on eﬃciency and generally
abstract from the government’s redistributive goals. They do not consider the minimum wage
when taxes and transfers are available to achieve these goals.
A second smaller literature in public economics investigates whether the minimum wage
is desirable for redistributive reasons in situations where the government can also use optimal
taxes and transfers for redistribution. The general principle, following Allen (1987) and Gues-
nerie and Roberts (1987), is that a minimum wage is desirable if it expands the redistributive
power of the government by relaxing incentive compatibility constraints. In the context of
the two-skill Stiglitz (1982) model with endogenous wages, Allen (1987) and Guesnerie and
Roberts (1987) show that a minimum wage can sometimes usefully supplement an optimal
linear tax,5 but is never useful in the presence of an optimal nonlinear tax even in the most
favorable case where unemployment is eﬃciently shared. This result is obtained because a
minimum wage does not in any way prevent high skilled workers from imitating low skilled
workers in the Stiglitz (1982) model. This contrasts with our occupational model and we will
return to this important diﬀerence.6 By contrast, Boadway and Cuﬀ (2001), using a continuum
of skills model as in Mirrlees (1971), show that a minimum wage policy combined with forcing
non-working welfare recipients to look for jobs and accept job oﬀers indirectly reveals skills at
the bottom of the distribution. This can be exploited by the government to target welfare on
low skilled individuals, thus improving upon the standard Mirrlees (1971) allocation.7
As recognized by Guesnerie and Roberts (1987), these contrasting results stem in part from
informational inconsistencies that arise when a minimum wage is introduced: the minimum
wage implementation requires observing wage rates, while the income tax is based on earnings
(because it is assumed that awge rates and hours of work are not separately observable for
5Allen (1987) notes, consistently with our results, that the minimum wage is more likely to be desirable
when the labor supply elasticity is high.
6Marceau and Boadway (1994) build upon those papers and show that a minimum wage can be desirable
when a participation constraint for low skilled workers is introduced. Although Marceau and Boadway do not
explicitly model this participation constraint using ﬁxed costs of work as we do, their paper can be seen as a
ﬁrst step in incorporating the labor force participation decision in the problem.
7Remarkably, this result is obtained in a ﬁxed wage model where the minimum wage destroys all jobs below
the minimum wage.
4tax purposes). If wage rates are directly observable, the government can achieve any ﬁrst best
allocation by conditioning taxes and transfers on immutable wage rates (and obviously, no
minimum wage would be needed). The negative results on the desirability of the minimum
wage of Allen (1987) appear in an environment where the government implicitly observes the
wage rates for low skilled workers – a necessity when implementing a minimum wage – yet
ignores this extra information when choosing the income tax. On the other hand, the positive
results of Boadway and Cuﬀ (2001) are obtained because the government uses other tools
that implicitly exploit information revealed by the minimum wage.8 Our analysis resolves this
informational inconsistency by abstracting from the hours of work decision and focusing only
on job choice and work participation decisions.9
Finally, some recent studies have brought together those two literature strands and explored
the issue of jointly optimal minimum wages and optimal taxes and transfers in imperfect
labor markets. Blumkin and Sadka (2005) consider a signalling model where employers do not
observe productivities perfectly and show that a minimum wage can be desirable to supplement
the optimal tax system. Cahuc and Laroque (2007) show that, in a monopsonistic labor market
model, with participation labor supply responses only, the minimum wage should not be used
when the government can use optimal nonlinear income taxation. Hungerbuhler and Lehmann
(2007) analyze a search model and show that a minimum wage can improve welfare even with
optimal income taxes if the bargaining power of workers is suﬃciently low. There, however, if
the government can directly increase the bargaining power of workers, the desirability of the
minimum wage vanishes. These latter two papers are most similar to our analysis in the sense
that they also abstract from the hours of work choice and consider only the participation margin
for labor supply. Our analysis, however, considers the simple case of perfect competition with
no market frictions. Therefore, we see our contribution as complementary to those of Cahuc
and Laroque (2007) and Hungerbuhler and Lehmann (2007).
8Some papers have actually explicitly modelled limitations on the use of taxes and transfers using political
economy arguments. In that context, a minimum wage can be a useful tool for redistribution (see e.g., Dr` eze
and Gollier, 1993 and Bacache and Lehmann, 2005).
9Although informational consistency is conceptually appealing, governments do use minimum wages based
on hours of work and income taxes based on earnings. Hence, it is still useful to consider the constrained
optimization problem combining taxes on earnings and minimum wage rates. Therefore, we will explain in
greater detail the deeper economic reasons why our results diﬀer from those of Allen (1987).
53 Optimal Minimum Wage with no Taxes/Transfers
3.1 The Model
• Demand Side
We consider a simple model with two labor inputs where production of a unique con-
sumption good F(h1,h2) depends on the number of low skilled workers h1 and the number of
high skilled workers h2. We assume perfectly competitive markets so that ﬁrms take wages
(w1,w2) as given. The production sector chooses labor demand (h1,h2) to maximize proﬁts:
Π = F(h1,h2) − w1h1 − w2h2, which leads to the standard ﬁrst order conditions where wages





for i = 1,2. We assume that in any equilibrium w1 < w2. We also assume constant returns to
scale, so that there are no proﬁts in equilibrium: Π = F(h1,h2) − w1h1 − w2h2 = 0.
• Supply Side
We assume each individual is either low skilled or high skilled. We normalize the population
of workers to one and denote by h0
1 and h0
2 the fraction of low and high skilled with h0
1 +h0
2 =
1. Each worker faces a cost of working, θ, representing her disutility of work. In order to
generate smooth supply curves, we assume that θ is distributed according to smooth cumulative
distributions P1(θ) and P2(θ) for low and high skilled individuals respectively. There are three
groups of individuals: group 0 for unemployed individuals (either low or high skilled) with
zero earnings, group 1 for low skilled workers earning w1, and group 2 for high skilled workers
earning w2. We denote by hi the fraction of individuals in each group i = 0,1,2.
In this section, we assume that there are no taxes/transfers. To simplify the exposition,
throughout the paper, we assume no income eﬀects in the labor supply decision.10 An individ-
ual with skill i and cost of work θ makes her binary labor supply decision l = 0,1 to maximize
utility u = wi · l − θ · l. Therefore, l = 1 if and only if θ ≤ wi. Hence, the aggregate labor
supply functions for i = 1,2 are:
hi = h0
i · Pi(wi). (2)
10The presence of income eﬀects would not change our key results as we show in Appendix B.3.










where pi = P0
i is the density distribution of θ.
• Competitive Equilibrium and Labor Demand
Combining the demand and supply side equations (1) and (2) deﬁnes a single undistorted





Figure 1a shows the competitive equilibrium for low skilled labor using standard supply
and demand curve representation. The supply curve is deﬁned as h1 = h0
1P1(w1). Due to
constant returns to scale in production, only the ratio h1/h2 is well deﬁned on the demand
side. For our purposes, we deﬁne the demand for low skilled work h1 = D1(w1) as follows:
D1(w1) is the level of demand when w1 is set exogenously by the government (such as with a
minimum wage policy) and (h2,w2) is deﬁned as the market clearing equilibrium on the high
skilled labor market. Therefore, Figure 1a implicitly captures general equilibrium eﬀects as






where the minus sign normalization is used so that η1 > 0.
• Government Social Welfare Objective
We assume that the government evaluates outcomes using a standard social welfare function
of the form: SW =
R
G(u)dν where u → G(u) is an increasing and concave transformation
of the individual money metric of individual utilities u = wi − θ · l. The concavity of G(.)
represents either individuals’ decreasing marginal utility of money and/or the redistributive
tastes of the government. Given the structure of our model, we can write social welfare as:
SW = (1 − h1 − h2)G(0) + h0
1
Z




G(w2 − θ)p2(θ)dθ. (4)






ratio of the demand side equations (1) implies that h1 = h2 · (a1/a2)
σ · (w2/w1)
σ. The no proﬁt condition








2 = 1, which deﬁnes w2(w1) as a function of w1. The supply
equation h2 = h
0




7With no minimum wage, integration in the second term of (4) goes from θ = 0 to w1 but
not when a minimum wage is binding, as we will discuss below. It is useful for our analysis
to introduce the concept of social marginal welfare weights at each occupation. Formally,
we deﬁne g0 = G0(0)/λ and gi = h0
i
R
G0(wi − θ)pidθ/(λ · hi) as the average social marginal
welfare weight of individuals in occupation i = 1,2. The normalization factor λ > 0 is chosen
so that those weights average to one: h0g0 + h1g1 + h2g2 = 1.12 Intuitively, gi measures the
social marginal value of redistributing one dollar uniformly across all individuals in occupation
i. In our model, because individuals cannot be forced to work, workers are better oﬀ than
non-workers. Hence concavity of G(.) implies g0 > g1 and g0 > g2.
3.2 Desirability of the Minimum Wage




2), and illustrated in Figure 1a, we introduce
a small minimum wage just above the low skilled wage w∗
1, which we denote by ¯ w = w∗
1 +d ¯ w.
The small minimum wage creates changes dw1,dw2,dh1,dh2 in our key variables of interest.
By deﬁnition, dw1 = d ¯ w. From Π = F(h1,h2)−w1h1−w2h2, we have dΠ =
P
i[(∂F/∂hi)dhi−
widhi−hidwi] = −h1dw1−h2dw2 using (1). The no proﬁt condition Π = 0 then implies dΠ = 0
and hence:
h1dw1 + h2dw2 = 0. (5)
Equation (5) is fundamental and shows that the earnings gain of low skilled workers h1dw1 >
0 (the dark red dashed rectangle on Figure 1a) due to a small minimum wage is entirely
compensated by an earnings loss of high skilled workers h2dw2 < 0. If g2 < g1 (i.e., the
government values redistribution from high skilled workers to low skilled workers) such a
transfer is socially desirable.
However, in addition to this transfer, the minimum wage also creates involuntary un-
employment (also depicted in Figure 1a). To evaluate the welfare cost of the involuntary
unemployment, we will make the important assumption of eﬃcient rationing.
Assumption 1 Eﬃcient Rationing: Workers who involuntarily lose their jobs due to the
minimum wage are those with the least surplus from working.
12In Section 4, we will show that λ is naturally the multiplier of the government budget constraint when the
government uses taxes and transfers.
8Conceptually, the minimum wage creates involuntary unemployment and hence an allo-
cation problem: which workers become involuntarily unemployed due to the minimum wage?
Under costless Coasian bargaining, this allocation problem would be resolved eﬃciently: a
worker with a low surplus from working would be willing to let an unemployed worker with
a high surplus take her job in exchange for a private transfer, leading to eﬃcient rationing
overall. In practice, the eﬃcient allocation might be reached because workers with the least
surplus are more likely to quit through natural attrition and because, if turnover is costly,
employers may ﬁrst lay oﬀ workers who are least likely to be stable employees (i.e., those with
low surplus from the job).13
In the end, determining which workers lose their jobs due to the minimum wage is an
empirical question. Unfortunately, empirical work on this question is thin. In the United
States, evidence of unemployment eﬀects is stronger among teenagers and secondary earners
(Neumark and Wascher 2006) who are likely to be more elastic - and hence have a lower
surplus - suggesting that rationing might be eﬃcient. More directly, Luttmer (2007) used
variation in state minimum wages to show (proxies for) reservation wages do not increase
following an increase in the minimum wage, suggesting that minimum wage induced rationing
is eﬃcient.14 Obviously, the case with eﬃcient rationing is the most favorable to minimum
wage policy. Therefore, in Appendix B.1 we also explore how our results change if we assume
that unemployment losses are distributed independently of surplus.
Under eﬃcient rationing, as can be seen in Figure 1a, as long as the supply elasticity is
positive (non-vertical supply curve) and the demand elasticity is ﬁnite (non-horizontal demand
curve), those who lose their jobs because of d ¯ w have inﬁnitesimal surplus. Therefore, the
welfare loss due to involuntary unemployment caused by the minimum wage is second order
and represented by the dashed light green triangle (exactly as in the standard Harberger
deadweight burden analysis). As a result, we have:
Proposition 1 With no taxes/transfers and under Assumption 1 (eﬃcient rationing), intro-
ducing a minimum wage is desirable if (1) the government values redistribution from high
skilled workers toward low skilled workers (g1 > g2); (2) the demand elasticity for low skilled
13It is conceivable, however, that resources (such as search costs or queuing costs) could be dissipated in
reaching the eﬃcient allocation.
14This is in contrast to a situation with low turnover, such as in the housing market with rent control, as in
Glaeser and Luttmer (2003).
9workers is ﬁnite; and (3) the supply elasticity of low skilled workers is positive.
The formal proof is presented in Appendix A.1. It is useful to brieﬂy analyze the desirability
of the minimum wage when any of those three conditions does not hold. Condition (1) is
necessary: it obviously fails if the government does not care about redistribution at all (g1 =
g2). It also fails in the extreme case where the government has Rawlsian preferences and only
cares about those out of work, meaning it values the marginal income of low and high skilled
workers equally (g1 = g2 = 0). Therefore, a minimum wage is desirable only for intermediate
redistributive tastes. Even in that case, condition (1) may fail if minimum wage workers
actually belong to well-oﬀ families (for example teenagers or secondary earners).15
Condition (2) is also necessary. If the demand elasticity is inﬁnite, which in our model
is equivalent to assuming low and high skill workers are perfect substitutes, (so that F =
a1h1 +a2h2 with ﬁxed parameters a1,a2), then any minimum wage set above the competitive
wage w∗
1 = a1 will completely shut down the low skilled labor market and therefore cannot be
desirable. A large body of empirical work suggests that the demand elasticity for low skilled
labor is not inﬁnite (see e.g. Hamermesh, 1996 for a survey). In addition, evidence of a spike
in the wage density distribution at the minimum wage also implies a ﬁnite demand elasticity
(Card and Krueger, 1995).
When condition (3) breaks down and the supply elasticity is zero, then there are no
marginal workers with zero surplus from working. Therefore, the unemployment welfare loss is
no longer second order. In that context, whether a minimum wage is desirable depends on the
parameters of the model (speciﬁcally, the reservation wages of low skilled workers and the size
of demand elasticity).16 Empirically, a large body of work has shown that there are substantial
participation supply elasticities for low skilled workers (see e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999
for a survey).
Finally, as we show in Appendix B.1, if the eﬃcient rationing assumption is replaced by
uniform rationing (i.e., unemployment strikes independently of surplus), then a small minimum
wage creates a ﬁrst order welfare loss. In that case, a minimum wage may or may not be
15It would be straightforward to capture such an eﬀect in our model by assuming that utility depends also
on other household members income. We would simply need to adjust the social welfare weights gi accordingly.
Kniesner (1981), Johnson and Browning (1983) and Burkhauser, Couch, and Glenn (1996) empirically analyze
this issue in the United States.
16The well known result that a minimum wage cannot be desirable if η1 > 1 is based on such a model with
ﬁxed labor supply.
10desirable depending on the parameters of the model.
3.3 Optimal Minimum Wage
Let us now derive the optimal minimum wage when the conditions of Proposition 1 are met.
As displayed in Figure 1b, with a non inﬁnitesimal minimum wage ¯ w > w∗
1, we can deﬁne w
as the reservation wage (or equivalently, the cost of work) of the marginal low skilled worker
(i.e. the worker getting the smallest surplus from working). Formally, w is deﬁned so that
h0
1P1(w) = D1( ¯ w). The government picks ¯ w to maximize








G(w2 − θ)p2(θ)dθ, (6)
subject to the constraints that wi = ∂F/∂hi for i = 1,2, the no proﬁt condition h1w1+h2w2 =
F(h1,h2), and h2 = h0
2P2(w2). This maximization problem is formally solved in Appendix A.1.
In order to obtain an intuitive understanding of the ﬁrst order condition for the optimal
minimum wage ¯ w, we consider a small change d ¯ w around ¯ w. Figure 1b shows that this change
has two eﬀects.
First, it creates a transfer h1d ¯ w toward low skilled workers at the expense of high skilled
workers (as h2dw2 = −h1d ¯ w from the no-proﬁt condition (5)). Using the deﬁnition of gi
introduced earlier, the net social value of this transfer is dT = [g1 − g2]h1d ¯ w.
Second, the minimum wage increases involuntary unemployment by dh1 = D0
1( ¯ w)d ¯ w =
−η1h1d ¯ w/ ¯ w. Using the eﬃcient rationing assumption, those marginal workers have a reser-
vation wage equal to w. Therefore, each newly unemployed worker has a social welfare cost
equal to G( ¯ w−w)−G(0). We can deﬁne ge
0 = [G( ¯ w−w)−G(0)]/[λ·( ¯ w−w)] as the marginal
welfare weight put on earnings lost due to unemployment. Thus, the welfare cost due to
unemployment is dU = −ge
0 · ( ¯ w − w) · η1 · h1d ¯ w/ ¯ w.
Note that the change dh2 < 0 does not generate welfare eﬀects because marginal workers
in the high skill sector have no surplus from working, making the welfare cost second order.
At the optimum, we have dT + dU = 0, which implies:







Formula (7) shows that the optimal minimum wage wedge (deﬁned as ( ¯ w−w)/ ¯ w) is decreasing
in the labor demand elasticity η1 as a higher elasticity creates larger negative unemployment
11eﬀects. The optimal wedge is increasing with g1−g2, which measures the net value of transfer-
ring $1 from high to low skilled workers, and decreasing in ge
0, which measures the social cost
of earning losses due to involuntary unemployment. Obviously ge
0, g1, and g2 are endogenous
parameters and depend on the primitive social welfare function G(.) and also on the level of the
minimum wage. At the optimum, however, we have ge
0 ≥ g1 ≥ g2. Increasing the redistributive
tastes of the government by choosing a more concave G(.) will have an ambiguous eﬀect on the
level of the optimal ¯ w because it will likely increase both g1 − g2 and ge
0. As discussed above,
the minimum wage should not be used if the government does not value redistribution at all
(g1 = g2) or if the government has extreme Rawlsian tastes (g1 = g2 = 0). Therefore, we can
expect the level of the optimal ¯ w to follow an inverted U-shape with the level of redistributive
tastes.
Formula (7) is not an explicit formula because it depends on w, which itself depends on
¯ w through the supply function (as illustrated on Figure 1b). However, if we assume that the
elasticities of demand η1 and supply e1 are constant, then we can obtain explicit formulas.
In this case D1(w1) = D0 · w
−η1
1 and S1(w1) = S0 · w
e1
1 so that S0 · w∗
1
e1 = D0 · w∗
1
−η1 and
S0 · we1 = D0 · ¯ w−η1. This implies that w = w∗
1 · (w∗
1/ ¯ w)η1/e1, and hence:
































where the approximation holds in the case of a small minimum wage (i.e., when (g2−g1)/(ge
0·η1)
is small). The formula shows that the optimal minimum wage ¯ w is decreasing in the supply
elasticity e1. The intuition here can be easily understood from Figure 1b. A higher supply
elasticity implies a ﬂatter supply curve, and hence lower costs from involuntary unemployment.
If the supply elasticity is high, then a small change in w1 has large eﬀects on supply, implying
that workers derive little surplus from working and do not lose much from minimum wage
induced unemployment. This result is very important because – as is well known – redistri-
bution through taxes/transfers is hampered by a high supply elasticity. Conversely, when the
supply elasticity is low, redistribution through minimum wage is costly while redistribution
through taxes/transfers is eﬃcient.
12Formula (8) shows that there are two channels through which a higher demand elasticity
η1 reduces the optimal minimum wage. The ﬁrst channel is the standard unemployment
level eﬀect mentioned when discussing (7), that a higher demand elasticity creates a larger
unemployment response to the minimum wage. The second channel is an unemployment cost
eﬀect which works through the link between the wedge ( ¯ w − w)/ ¯ w and the minimum wage
markup ¯ w/w∗
1. A higher demand elasticity implies that a given minimum wage markup is
associated with a larger wedge, hence higher unemployment costs for the marginal worker.
The distinction between those two channels is important because, as we will see later, the
ﬁrst classical unemployment level eﬀect disappears with optimal taxes and transfers, but the
unemployment cost eﬀect remains.
The logic of our optimal minimum wage formula easily extends to a more general model
with many labor inputs (including a continuum with a smooth wage density), a capital input
or pure proﬁts, and many consumption goods. In those contexts, g2 is the average social
welfare weight across each factor bearing the incidence of the minimum wage increase. Some
of the factors can have a negative weight in this average. For example, if there are neo-classical
spillovers of a minimum wage increase to slightly higher paid workers (as in Teulings, 2000),
it is conceivable that g2 could be negative. Conversely, if a minimum wage increase leads to
higher consumption prices for goods consumed by low income families (such as fast food), g2
would be higher (and conceivably even above g1 if minimum wage workers belong to families
with higher incomes than typical fast food consumers).
4 Optimal Minimum Wage with Taxes and Transfers
4.1 Introducing Taxes and Transfers
We assume that the government can observe job outcomes (not working, work in sector 1 paying
w1, or work in sector 2 paying w2), but not the costs of work. Therefore, the government can
condition tax and transfers only on observable work outcomes. Let us denote the tax on
occupation i by Ti; Ti is a transfer if Ti < 0. We denote by ci = wi −Ti the disposable income
in occupation i = 0,1,2. This represents a fully general nonlinear income tax on earnings.
As in our previous model without taxes, an individual with skill i = 1,2 deciding to work
earns wi but increases his disposable by ci − c0. We can therefore deﬁne a tax rate τi on skill
13i workers: 1 − τi = (ci − c0)/wi. An individual of skill i = 1,2 and with costs of work θ works
if and only if θ ≤ ci −c0 = (1−τi)wi. Hence, the aggregate labor supply functions for i = 1,2
are:
hi = h0
i · Pi((1 − τi)wi) = h0
i · Pi(ci − c0). (9)
As above, we denote by ei the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the net-of-tax wage







(1 − τi)wi · pi((1 − τi)wi)
Pi((1 − τi)wi)
.
The demand side of the economy is unchanged. For given parameters c0, τ1, τ2 deﬁning






Assuming no exogenous spending requirement, the government budget constraint can be
written as:17
h0c0 + h1c1 + h2c2 ≤ h1w1 + h2w2. (10)
We denote by λ the multiplier of the government budget constraint.
4.2 Minimum Wage Desirability with Fixed Tax Rates
We ﬁrst analyze how our previous analysis on the desirability of the minimum wage is aﬀected
by the presence of taxes and transfers assuming that τ1,τ2 are exogenously ﬁxed and that
the transfer c0 adjusts automatically to meet the government budget constraint when a small
minimum wage ¯ w = w∗
1 + d ¯ w is introduced. We assume that the minimum wage applies
to wages before taxes and transfers.18 This assumption does not aﬀect the desirability of a
minimum wage and is the most convenient convention.
Proposition 2 With ﬁxed tax rates τ1,τ2, under Assumption 1 (eﬃcient rationing) and as-
suming e1 > 0 and η1 < ∞, introducing a minimum wage is desirable if and only if
g1 · (1 − τ1) − g2 · (1 − τ2) + τ1 − τ2 − τ2 · e2 − τ1 · η1 > 0. (11)
17None of our results would be changed if we assumed a positive exogenous spending requirement for the
government.
18In practice, the legal minimum wage applies to wages net of employer payroll taxes, but before employee
payroll taxes, income taxes, and transfers. ¯ w should be interpreted as the minimum wage including employer
taxes.
14The proof is presented in Appendix A.2.
When τ1 = τ2 = 0, equation (11) reduces to g1 − g2 > 0 (Proposition 1). Equation (11)
shows that with taxes/transfers, introducing a minimum wage creates four ﬁscal eﬀects that
need to be taken into account in the welfare analysis: ﬁrst, transferring one dollar pre-tax from
high to low skilled workers through the minimum wage implies a $ (1 − τ1) post tax transfer
to low skilled workers and a $ (1 − τ2) post tax loss to high skilled workers (captured by the
factor (1−τi) multiplying g1 and g2 in (11)). Second, such a transfer creates a direct net ﬁscal
eﬀect τ1 − τ2. Third, the reduction in w2 leads to a supply eﬀect further reducing taxes paid
by the high skilled by e2 · τ2 per dollar transferred. Finally, involuntary unemployment also
creates a tax loss equal to −τ1 · η1 per dollar transferred.19
It is important to note that a minimum wage cannot be replicated with taxes and transfers.
Returning to Figure 1a – the case with no taxes – it is tempting to think that a small tax
on low skilled workers creates the same wedge between supply and demand as the minimum
wage. However, to replicate the minimum wage, this small tax should be rebated lump-sum
to low skilled workers only. Obviously, if the tax is rebated to low skilled workers, those
who dropped out of work because of the tax would want to come back to work. Without a
rationing mechanism preventing this labor supply response, taxes and transfers cannot achieve
the minimum wage allocation.
Cahuc and Laroque (2007) make the point that a minimum wage can be replicated by a
knife-edge nonlinear income tax such that T(w) = w for 0 < w < ¯ w (as nobody would want
to work in a job paying less than ¯ w, employers would be forced to pay at least ¯ w to attract
workers), and concluded that a minimum wage is redundant with a fully general nonlinear
income tax. This argument is mathematically correct, but such a knife-edge income tax is
eﬀectively a minimum wage. Our model rules out such knife-edge income taxes because we
consider tax rates that are occupation speciﬁc (rather than wage level speciﬁc). However, a
fully general knife-edge income tax could not do better than the combination of our occupation
speciﬁc tax rates combined with a minimum wage. Therefore, we think the deﬁnition of the
tax and minimum wage tools we use is the most illuminating to understand the problem of
19Note that when low skilled work is subsidized (τ1 < 0), then the unemployment created by a small min-
imum wage creates a positive ﬁscal externality proportional to the demand elasticity η1. In such a situation,
introducing a minimum wage would actually be desirable even without redistributive tastes (g1 = g2 = 1) if
−τ1 · η1 > τ2 · e2.
15joint minimum wage and tax optimization.
4.3 Optimal Tax Formulas with no Minimum Wage
The government chooses c0,c1,c2 in order to maximize social welfare









subject to the budget constraint (10) with multiplier λ. As shown in Appendix A.3, we have
the following conditions at the optimum:







for i = 1,2. Equation (12) implies that the average of marginal welfare weights across the
three groups i = 0,1,2 is one. Indeed, the value of distributing one dollar to everybody is
exactly the average marginal social weight, and the cost of distributing one dollar in terms of
revenue lost is also one dollar (as we have assumed away income eﬀects).20
Equation (13) can be understood from Figure 2a. Starting from an allocation (c0,c1,c2),
increasing c1 by dc1 > 0 leads to a positive direct welfare eﬀect h1g1dc1 > 0, a mechanical
loss in tax revenue −h1dc1 < 0, and a behavioral response increasing work by dh1 = dc1 ·
e1h1/(w1(1 − τ1)) > 0 and creating a ﬁscal eﬀect equal to τ1w1dh1 = dc1 · h1 · e1 · τ1/(1 − τ1).
The sum of those three eﬀects is zero, which implies (13).
If g1 > 1, then the optimal tax rate on low skilled work should be negative because the
ﬁrst two terms net out positive so that the ﬁscal eﬀect due to the behavioral response has to
be negative, requiring τ1 < 0.21
Equations (12) and (13) are identical to those derived by Saez (2002) in the same model,
but with ﬁxed wages. Indeed, it is well known since Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), that optimal
tax formulas remain the same when producer prices are endogenous.22 Figure 2b illustrates
this key point for our subsequent analysis. When w1,w2 are endogenous, the small reform
20See Appendix B.3. for an analysis with income eﬀects.
21This was the key result emphasized by Diamond (1980), Saez (2002), Laroque (2005), Chon´ e and Laroque
(2005, 2006): an EITC type transfer for low wage workers is optimal in a situation where individuals respond
only along the extensive margin.
22Piketty (1997) and Saez (2004) have shown that the occupational model we consider inherits this important
property of the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) model.
16dc1 leads to changes in h1 and hence to changes dw1 and dw2 through demand side eﬀects.
However, assuming that c2 and c1 + dc1 are kept unchanged, the eﬀect of dw1 and dw2 is
ﬁscally neutral because h1dw1 + h2dw2 = 0, which follows from the no-proﬁt condition (5).
Let us denote by (wT
i ,cT
i ) the tax/transfer optimum with no minimum wage.
4.4 Optimal Minimum Wage under Optimal Taxes and Transfers
• Minimum Wage Desirability with Optimal Taxes and Transfers
As illustrated on Figure 3, starting from the tax/transfer optimum (wT
i ,cT
i ), let us intro-
duce a minimum wage set at ¯ w = wT
1 . Such a minimum wage is just binding and has no direct
impact on the allocation. Let us now increase c1 by dc1 while keeping c0 and c2 constant. As
we showed above, such a change provides incentives for some low skilled individuals to start
working. However, as we showed in Figure 2b, such a labor supply response would reduce w1
through demand side eﬀects. However, in the presence of a minimum wage ¯ w set at wT
1 , w1
cannot fall, implying that those individuals willing to start working cannot work and actually
shift from voluntary to involuntary unemployment. The assumption of eﬃcient rationing is
key here as these are precisely the individuals with the lowest surplus from working. Given
that the labor supply channel is eﬀectively shut down by the minimum wage, the dc1 change is
like a lump-sum tax reform and its net welfare eﬀect is simply [g1 −1]h1dc1. This implies that
if g1 > 1, introducing a minimum wage improves upon the tax/transfer optimum allocation.23
This result corresponds with the theory of optimum quantity controls developed by Gues-
nerie (1981) and Guesnerie and Roberts (1984) showing that, in an optimum Ramsey tax
model, introducing a quantity control on subsidized goods is desirable. In our model, a mini-
mum wage is an indirect way for the government to introduce rationing on low skilled workers
subsidized by the optimal tax system.24
We show in Appendix B.2 this result generalizes easily to a broader model with many
skills and fully general labor supply response functions where individuals can respond along
the (discrete) intensive margin by shifting to lower paid occupations in response to taxes.
23The fact that a minimum wage is desirable if g1 > 1 can also be seen from Proposition 2 by using the
optimal tax rates from equations (13). In that case, equation (11) boils down to −τ1 · (e1 + η1) > 0 which is
indeed equivalent to g1 > 1.
24Guesnerie and Roberts (1987) proposed an analysis of optimal minimum wage. However, the model they
considered was not directly related to their earlier optimum quantity constraints theory (see our discussion just
below).
17The logic of the minimum wage desirability remains exactly the same as the one displayed in
Figure 3: even if higher skilled workers wanted to shift to occupation w1 when c1 increases,
a minimum wage set at wT
1 would eﬀectively block such a labor supply response (again under
our key assumption of eﬃcient rationing).
This remark can help explain why our results contrast with the negative results of Allen
(1987) or Guesnerie and Roberts (1987) obtained in the context of the Stiglitz (1982) two-type
model of optimal nonlinear taxation. The key theoretical diﬀerence between the Stiglitz model
and the occupation model we use is that in the Stiglitz model high skilled individuals imitating
low skilled individuals cut their hours of work, but remain in the high skill sector. Thus the
minimum wage makes it easier for them to imitate low skilled workers. In contrast, in our
model the minimum wage eﬀectively prevents high skilled workers from occupying minimum
wage jobs (by rationing low skilled work). Perhaps more importantly, absent the minimum
wage, everybody works in the Stiglitz model, which therefore cannot capture the participation
decision of low skilled workers - a decision which strikes us as central to the minimum wage
problem in the real world.25
Comparing with the case with no taxes in Section 3, we note that the condition g1 > 1
is stronger than the earlier condition g1 > g2 (as g0,g1,g2 average to one and g0 > g1 > g2,
we have g2 < 1). However, if the government has redistributive tastes, then g1 > 1 is a weak
condition as the low skilled sector can be chosen to represent the very lowest income workers.
This also implies that, when the government uses taxes optimally and in the presence of many
factors of production or many output goods, the incidence of the minimum wage on other
factors (captured by the term g2 in the case with no taxes) becomes irrelevant: the government
can eﬀectively undo the incidence eﬀects by adjusting taxes on other factors, keeping their
net-of-tax rewards constant.26 In particular, whether the minimum wage creates neo-classical
spill-over eﬀects on slightly higher wages and whether the minimum wage increases prices of
goods disproportionately consumed by low income families are irrelevant when assessing the
25Indeed, Marceau and Boadway (1994) show that a minimum wage can be desirable in a Stiglitz type model
by implicitly adding ﬁxed costs of work (and hence a participation decision) for low skilled workers. Marceau
and Boadway (1994) do not model explicitly ﬁxed costs of work, but such ﬁxed costs are necessary for the
assumptions of their main proposition (p. 78) to be met. Our model has the advantage of explicitly modelling
the participation decision and also avoiding the information inconsistency inherent to the Stiglitz model with
minimum wage.
26This is directly related to the important fact that incidence on pre-tax prices is irrelevant in optimal
Diamond-Mirrlees tax formulas.
18desirability of the minimum wage in the presence of optimal taxes. The only relevant factor is
whether the government values redistribution to minimum wage workers relative to an across
the board lump-sum redistribution (i.e., the condition g1 > 1).
Finally, we show in Appendix B.1 that the desirability of the minimum wage hinges crucially
on the “eﬃcient rationing” assumption. We show that, under “uniform rationing” (where
unemployment strikes independently of surplus), the minimum wage cannot improve upon the
optimal tax allocation. Indeed, with eﬃcient rationing, a minimum wage eﬀectively reveals
the marginal workers to the government. Since costs of work are unobservable, this is valuable
because it allows the government to sort workers into a more (socially albeit not privately)
eﬃcient set of occupations, making the minimum wage desirable. In contrast, with uniform
rationing, a minimum wage does not reveal anything about costs of work (as unemployment
strikes randomly). As a result, it only creates (privately) ineﬃcient sorting across occupations
without revealing anything of value to the government. It is not surprising that a minimum
wages would not be desirable in this context.
• Optimal Minimum Wage with Taxes and Transfers
Let us now turn to the joint optimization of the tax/transfer system and the minimum
wage. Formally, the government chooses ¯ w,c0,c1,c2 to maximize









subject to its budget constraint (with multiplier λ). As above, w is deﬁned as the reservation
wage of the marginal worker: h0
1 · P1(w(1 − τ1)) = D1( ¯ w) where D1( ¯ w) is the demand for low
skilled labor for a given minimum wage ¯ w. The second term in (14) incorporates the eﬃcient
rationing assumption as workers are those with the lowest cost of work and hence the highest
surplus.
We solve this maximization problem formally in Appendix A.4. The ﬁrst order condition
with respect to c0 implies that h0g0 + h1g1 + h2g2 = 1. The ﬁrst order condition with respect
to c2 leads to the standard formula (13): τ2/(1−τ2) = (1−g2)/e2, as the minimum wage does
not impact the trade-oﬀ for the choice of c2.
With a binding minimum wage, as we illustrated in Figure 3, increasing c1 is a lump-
sum transfer. Therefore, the government will increase c1 up to the point where g1 = 1. A
19minimum wage allows the government to redistribute to low skilled workers at no eﬃciency
cost and hence achieve “full redistribution to low skilled workers,” making the minimum wage
a powerful redistributive tool. We show in Appendix B.2 that this result is easily generalized
to a model with numerous labor inputs and more general labor supply responses.
Finally, there is a ﬁrst order condition for the optimal choice of ¯ w. Increasing ¯ w by d ¯ w and
keeping c0,c1,c2 constant leads to an increase in involuntary unemployment: dh1 < 0. Such
involuntary unemployment leads to a (negative) welfare eﬀect on those individuals equal to
dh1[G(c0+( ¯ w−w)(1−τ1))−G(c0)]/λ < 0 and a ﬁscal eﬀect equal to dh1·τ1· ¯ w.27 Therefore,
the two eﬀects caused by dh1 need to cancel out at the optimum. Hence the ﬁscal eﬀect needs
to be positive, requiring τ1 < 0 as dh1 < 0. We then have the following ﬁrst order condition:
−τ1 · ¯ w =
G(c0 + ( ¯ w − w)(1 − τ1)) − G(c0)
λ
. (15)
As we did in Section 3, we can introduce the social marginal weight on earnings losses due to
(marginal) involuntary unemployment: ge
0 = [G(c0+( ¯ w−w)(1−τ1))−G(c0)]/[λ( ¯ w−w)(1−τ1)]
in order to rewrite (15) as:










We summarize all those results in the following proposition (formally proved in Appendix A.4):
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 1 (eﬃcient rationing), assuming e1 > 0 and η1 < ∞, if
g1 > 1 at the optimal tax allocation (with no minimum wage), then introducing a minimum
wage is desirable. Furthermore, at the joint minimum wage and tax optimum, we have:
• h0g0 + h1g1 + h2g2 = 1 (Social welfare weights average to one)
• τ2/(1 − τ2) = (1 − g2)/e2 > 0 (Formula for τ2 unchanged)
• g1 = 1 (Full redistribution to low skilled workers)
• ( ¯ w − w)/ ¯ w = −τ1/[(1 − τ1) · ge
0] > 0 (Negative tax rate on low skilled work τ1 < 0)
Quantitatively, τ1 is primarily determined to meet the condition g1 = 1. The optimal
minimum wage wedge ( ¯ w − w)/ ¯ w is determined by equation (16) and is increasing in the size
of the absolute subsidy |τ1| and decreasing in the social weight on unemployment earnings
27As usual, the changes in dw1 and dw2 induced by the minimum wage change do not have any ﬁscal
consequence as we have h1dw1 + h2dw2 = 0 due to the no proﬁt condition (5).
20losses ge
0. As discussed in Section 3, we can deﬁne the implicit market wage rate w1 as the
wage rate that would prevail under the same tax rates τ1,τ2, but with no minimum wage. In
that case, assuming constant elasticity of supply and demand, we showed that the minimum
wage markup over the market wage rate ¯ w/w1 for a given minimum wage wedge ( ¯ w−w)/ ¯ w was
increasing in e1 and decreasing in η1. This implies that our previous result (that the optimal
minimum wage increases with e1 and decreases with η1) carries over to the case with optimal
taxes. It is important to note that a high demand elasticity leads to a smaller minimum
wage not because it creates more unemployment, but because a large demand elasticity makes
unemployment more costly by increasing the wedge ( ¯ w − w)/ ¯ w.
The previous result that the optimal minimum wage follows an inverted U-shape pattern
with the strength of redistributive tastes also carries over to the case with optimal taxes.
Extreme redistributive (Rawlsian) tastes imply that g1 = 0 < 1 and thus no minimum wage is
desirable. Conversely, no redistributive tastes imply that g0 = g1 = g2 = 1, a situation where
no minimum wage is desirable.
• A Minimum Wage with τ1 > 0 is 2nd Best Pareto Ineﬃcient
The last result from Proposition 3 on the negativity of τ1 at the joint minimum wage and
tax optimum has a very important corollary:
Proposition 4 In our model with extensive labor supply responses, a binding minimum wage
associated with a positive tax rate on minimum wage earnings (τ1 > 0) is second-best Pareto
ineﬃcient. This result remains a-fortiori true when rationing is not eﬃcient.
Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 4 which depicts a situation with a binding minimum
wage and a positive tax rate on low skilled work τ1 > 0. Suppose that the government
reduces the minimum wage (d ¯ w < 0) while keeping c0,c1,c2 constant. Reducing the minimum
wage leads to a positive employment eﬀect dh1 > 0 as involuntary unemployment is reduced,
improving the welfare of the newly employed workers and increasing tax revenue as τ1 > 0.
The increase dh1 > 0 also leads to a change dw2 > 0. However, because h1d ¯ w + h2dw2 = 0
(through the no-proﬁt condition (5)), the mechanical ﬁscal eﬀect of d ¯ w and dw2, keeping c1
and c2 constant, is zero. Because c0,c1,c2 remain constant, nobody’s welfare is reduced.28 The
28Because, c2 − c0 remains constant, h2 does not change either.
21increase in welfare due to the reduction in unemployment remains a-fortiori true if rationing
is not eﬃcient. Therefore, this reform is a second-best Pareto improvement.
The results of Proposition 4 do not necessarily carry over to a model with general labor
supply functions. For example, if workers respond along the intensive margin, the minimum
wage generates not only involuntary unemployment, but also involuntary over-work as high
skilled workers are also rationed out. In that case, a minimum wage decrease would induce high
skilled workers to become minimum wage workers, reducing government revenue. However,
the fact that the minimum wage can create over-work is rarely discussed in empirical studies,
suggesting the intensive response channel is unimportant empirically.
Proposition 4 may have wide applicability because many OECD countries, especially in
continental Europe, combine signiﬁcant minimum wages (OECD 1998, Immervoll 2007) with
very high tax rates on low skilled work (Immervoll et al. 2007). The high tax rates are
generated by substantial payroll tax rates (ﬁnancing social security beneﬁts) and by the high
phasing-out rates of traditional means-tested transfer programs.
In practice, the reform described in Proposition 4 could be achieved by cutting the employer
payroll taxes for low income workers which lowers the (gross) minimum wage without aﬀecting
the net minimum wage after taxes and transfers.29 Such a policy should stimulate low skill
employment and increase high skill wages. Thus, the direct loss in tax revenue due to the
payroll tax cut on low skilled workers could be recouped by adjusting upward taxes on high
earning workers (without hurting high earning workers on net). A number of OECD countries
have already implemented such policy reforms over the last 15 years.30
The US policy in recent decades of letting inﬂation erode the minimum wage while ex-
panding the Earned Income Tax Credit is closely related. The EITC expansions compensate
minimum wage workers for the erosion in the minimum wage (so that they do not lose on net)
and attracts previously unemployed workers into the labor force increasing their welfare and
increasing tax revenue (assuming τ1 > 0 because of the phasing-out of welfare programs). In
principle, the direct ﬁscal cost of the EITC expansion (which maintains c1 constant) can be
recouped by increasing τ2 as w2 increases (so that c2 also stays constant).
29Politically, it is extremely diﬃcult to directly cut the legal minimum wage.
30For example, France started reducing the employer payroll tax on low income workers in the early 1990s
(see Cr´ epon and Desplatz, 2002 for an empirical analysis).
225 Numerical Simulations
• Case with no Taxes or Fixed Taxes
We make the following parametric assumptions: (1) we assume a CES production function
with elasticity of substitution σ > 0; (2) we assume constant labor supply elasticities ei > 0 by
choosing Pi(w) = (w/¯ θi)ei. Furthermore, we assume (h0
1,h0
2) = (1/4,3/4), and a CRRA social
welfare function G(u) = (u + B)1−γ/(1 − γ) with risk aversion parameter γ > 0 and where
B > 0 is a constant used to avoid inﬁnitely negative utility or inﬁnite social marginal utility for
non-workers.31 We calibrate the production function so that (w∗
1,w∗
2) = (1,3) and the labor
supply functions so that (h∗
0,h∗
1,h∗
2) = (0.2,0.2,0.6) at the no minimum wage equilibrium.
Throughout, we also assume e2 = 0.25 and B = 0.5.
Panel A in Table 1 displays the optimal minimum wage markup over the undistorted market
wage w∗
1 as well as the involuntary unemployment rate (among all low skilled individuals)
under various scenarios for e1, σ, and γ. The table conﬁrms that the optimal minimum wage
is increasing in e1 (comparing columns (1), (2), (3)), decreasing in σ (comparing columns (4),
(5), (6)), and has an inverted U-shape pattern with γ (comparing panels A1, A2, and A3).
The optimal minimum wage is small for a high γ = 3 value.
Panel B in Table 1 illustrates numerically that, starting from a substantial ﬂat rate tax
where τ1 = τ2 = 0.35 (and using the same parametrization as in Panel A), the optimal
minimum wage is much lower in this case than with no taxes (and is actually useless when
σ = e1 = 0.25).
• Case with Optimal Taxes
Table 2 provides some numerical simulation illustrations using the same parametrization
as in the situation with no taxes/transfers (Table 1). Table 2 shows the optimal tax rates
with no minimum wage, and displays the optimal tax rates and the optimal minimum wage
markup (and associated unemployment level among the unskilled) in the case of joint minimum
wage/tax optimization. Table 2 conﬁrms our key ﬁndings that the minimum wage should be
associated with higher low skilled work subsidies than the case of optimal tax rates with no
minimum wage. Table 2 also shows that the optimal minimum wage is increasing with e1
31B could represent for example a uniform lump-sum transfer, whose cost is unaﬀected by behavioral re-
sponses.
23and decreasing with σ. Finally, the minimum wage is useless in the high redistributive case
γ = 3 as g1 < 1 at the pure tax optimum.32 Interestingly, comparing Tables 1 and 2 suggests
that the minimum wage with optimal taxes is not necessarily smaller than in the case without
taxes, especially when redistributive tastes are not too large (γ = 0.5).
6 Conclusion
Our paper proposes a theoretical analysis of optimal minimum wage policy for redistribution
purposes in a perfectly competitive labor market, considering both the case with no taxes/
transfers and the case with optimal taxes/ transfers. In light of the previous literature on
this topic, we ﬁnd that the standard competitive labor market model oﬀers a surprisingly
strong case for using the minimum wage when we adopt the eﬃcient rationing assumption.
The minimum wage is a useful tool if the government values redistribution toward low wage
workers, and this remains true in the presence of optimal nonlinear taxes/transfers. In that
context, our model of occupational choice abstracting from hours of work allows us to overcome
the informational inconsistency that plagued previous work analyzing minimum wage policy
with optimal income taxation. Our model ﬁts into the general theory of rationing developed
by Guesnerie (1981) and Guesnerie and Roberts (1984) showing a minimum wage eﬀectively
rations low skilled labor. Such rationing is desirable because the optimal tax/transfer over-
encourages the supply of low skilled labor.
When low skilled labor supply is along the extensive margin, as empirical studies suggest,
a minimum wage should always be associated with in-work subsidies: the co-existence of mini-
mum wages and positive participation tax rates for low skilled workers is (second-best) Pareto
ineﬃcient. In that situation (common in most OECD countries) a cut in employer payroll taxes
decreasing the gross minimum wage while keeping the net minimum wage constant, combined
with an oﬀsetting tax increase on higher skilled workers is Pareto improving.
There are a number of issues that we have abstracted from in our very stylized model that
are worth pointing out as caveats and potential avenues for future research.
First, as mentioned, we abstract from the hours of work decision which allows us to develop
32The fact that the minimum wage is zero is in large part the consequence of the two skill model assumption.
A model with many skills would generate g1 > 1 at the tax optimum except for extreme Rawlsian redistributive
tastes. As discussed below, such a model could cast light on where in the wage distribution should the minimum
wage be set.
24a model with no informational inconsistencies. However, in practice, taxes and transfers are
based on earnings while minimum wages are based on hourly rates. In reality, the government
can observe both earnings and hours of work of employees as this information is generally
included in the payroll accounting of employers and is sometimes required to be reported to the
government for administering payroll taxes or maximum hours laws. Therefore, the question
remains why taxes and transfers are based on earnings rather than wage rates. A possible
explanation is that hours of work are not very elastic, and most of the labor supply responses
take place in the form of occupation decisions, and in particular in labor force participation
decisions. If hours were very elastic, taxes and transfers should be based (at least in part) on
wage rates.33 We conjecture that our results on the desirability of the minimum wage would
carry over to that case as well.
Second, a minimum wage rationing mechanism operates very diﬀerently from a tax and
transfer which alters prices, but lets markets clear freely. The rationing induced by the min-
imum wage creates an allocation problem with no natural market. It is conceivable that the
allocation problem might not lead to the eﬃcient rationing allocation (as we assumed), or that
the transaction costs (search costs or queuing costs) needed to reach that eﬃcient allocation
are not negligible. Evaluating such costs using a model with frictions would be valuable.34
It is also conceivable that rationing and the ensuing involuntary unemployment would create
additional psychological costs (such as feelings of low self-worth) that are not captured in
standard models (including those with search frictions), which would make minimum wage
policies less attractive in practice.
Finally, our numerical simulations have been purely illustrative and it would be worth
trying to calibrate these using empirically estimated parameters for the wage distribution, the
elasticities of labor demand and supply, and the degree of rationing eﬃciency created by the
minimum wage.
33Some transfer programs are based partly on hours information. For example, the British Working Families
Credit is given only to families where one earner works at least 16 hours a week. The current US welfare
program TANF imposes work requirements, which is an indirect way of conditioning transfers on hours of work.
34Hungerbuhler and Lehmann (2007) have made an important step in this direction by analyzing optimal
minimum wage policy with optimal tax in a search model.
25A Appendix: Formal Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 and Formula (7)
Social welfare is given by:










where w is deﬁned as h0



























· G(0) · p2(w2).
The second and last term cancel out (as marginal high skill workers are indiﬀerent between
working or not). The no-proﬁt condition F(h1,h2) = w1h1+w2h2 implies that h1d ¯ w+h2dw2 =
0 so that dw2/d ¯ w = −h1/h2. Furthermore, h0
1 · P1(w) = D1( ¯ w) implies that h0
1 · p1(w)dw =
D0















= −η1 · ge
0 ·
¯ w − w
¯ w
· h1 · λ + [g1 − g2] · h1 · λ,
where we used the deﬁnitions of η1,ge
0,g1,g2 in the last equality. Thus, starting from the
competitive equilibrium where ¯ w = w = w∗
1, the ﬁrst term is zero, making the minimum wage
desirable if and only if g1 > g2, hence proving Proposition 1. At the optimum ¯ w, dSW/d ¯ w = 0
which leads immediately to formula (7). 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Social welfare is given by:
SW( ¯ w) = [1 − D1( ¯ w) − h0









G(c0 + w2(1 − τ2) − θ)p2(θ)dθ,
where w is deﬁned as h0
1 · P1(w(1 − τ1)) = D1( ¯ w). The government budget constraint is
c0 ≤ D1( ¯ w)τ1 ¯ w+h0
2P2(w2(1−τ2))τ2w2. We denote by λ the multiplier of the budget constraint
and we introduce the Lagrangian
L = SW( ¯ w) + λ · [D1( ¯ w)τ1 ¯ w + h0
2P2(w2(1 − τ2))τ2w2 − c0].
26The ﬁrst order condition with respect to c0 is:
dL
dc0




G0(c1 − θ)p1(θ)dθ +
Z w2(1−τ2)
0
G0(c2 − θ)p2(θ)dθ − λ = 0.
Using the deﬁnitions of g0,g1,g2, we obtain immediately h1g0 + h1g1 + h2g2 = 1.
Starting from the competitive equilibrium with no minimum wage ¯ w = w = w1, we have:
dL
d ¯ w
| ¯ w=w1 = −D0
1(w1) · G(c0) − h0
2(1 − τ2) ·
dw2
d ¯ w

































The second and sixth terms cancel out. From h0
1 · P1(w(1 − τ1)) = D1( ¯ w), we have h0
1 ·
p1(w1(1 − τ1))(1 − τ1)dw/d ¯ w = D0
1(w1) at ¯ w = w = w1. The ﬁrst and third terms cancel
out. The no-proﬁt condition F(h1,h2) = ¯ wh1 + w2h2 implies h1d ¯ w + h2dw2 = 0 and hence












| ¯ w=w1 = (1 − τ1) · g1 − (1 − τ2) · g2 + τ1 − η1 · τ1 − τ2 · (1 + e2),
which is condition (11) in Proposition 2. 
A.3 Optimal Tax Formulas (13) with no Minimum Wage
Let us introduce ∆c1 = c1 − c0 and ∆c2 = c2 − c0. The government chooses c0,∆c1,∆c2 to
maximize social welfare SW subject to its budget constraint h0c0+h1c1+h2c2 ≤ w1h1+w2h2,
which can be rewritten as c0 + h1∆c1 + h2∆c2 ≤ h1w1 + h2w2. Therefore, the Lagrangian of













1P1(∆c1)(w1 − ∆c1) + h0
2P2(∆c2)(w2 − ∆c2) − c0],
The ﬁrst order condition in c0 (keeping ∆c1 and ∆c1 constant) is:
dL
dc0




G0(c1 − θ)p1(θ)dθ +
Z ∆c2
0
G0(c2 − θ)p2(θ)dθ − λ = 0.
Using the deﬁnitions of g0,g1,g2, we obtain immediately h1g0 + h1g1 + h2g2 = 1. The ﬁrst














1p1(∆c1)(w1 − ∆c1) − h0








The ﬁrst and third term cancel out (with no minimum wage, marginal low skilled workers are
indiﬀerent between working or not working). The no-proﬁt condition F(h1,h2) = w1h1+w2h2
implies that h1dw1 + h2dw2 = 0 and hence h1dw1/d∆c1 + h2dw2/d∆c1 = 0 so that the last
























which implies equation (13) for i = 1. The proof for i = 2 is exactly the same. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The government chooses c0,∆c1,∆c2, ¯ w to maximize social welfare SW subject to its budget
constraint c0+h1∆c1+h2∆c2 ≤ h1w1+h2w2. The Lagrangian of the government maximization
problem is:










+λ · [D1( ¯ w)( ¯ w − ∆c1) + h0
2P2(∆c2)(w2 − ∆c2) − c0].
where ¯ θ in the ﬁrst integral term is deﬁned so that the number of low skilled workers exactly
meets the demand: h0
1 · P1(¯ θ) = D1( ¯ w). The ﬁrst order condition with respect to c0 (keeping
28∆c1 and ∆c2, and ¯ w constant) implies h1g0 + h1g1 + h2g2 = 1 (same proof as in Appendix
A.3, note that ¯ w constant implies w2 is constant through the no-proﬁt condition). Similarly,
the ﬁrst order condition with respect to ∆c2 implies τ2/(1 − τ2) = (1 − g2)/e2.









G0(c1 − θ)p1(θ)dθ − λ · D1( ¯ w),
which implies g1 = 1.

















By deﬁnition of τ1, we have ∆c1 = ¯ w(1 − τ1). Introducing the reservation wage w of the
marginal worker deﬁned as w(1 − τ1) = ¯ θ as in the text, and noting that h0
1 · P1(¯ θ) = D1( ¯ w),
we have h0
1 · p1(¯ θ)d¯ θ/d ¯ w = D0
1( ¯ w). Finally, the no-proﬁt condition F(h1,h2) = ¯ wh1 + w2h2
implies h1d ¯ w + h2dw2 = 0 and hence dw2/d ¯ w = −h1/h2. As a result, the last two terms in





1( ¯ w)[G(c0 + (1 − τ1)( ¯ w − w)) − G(c0)] + λ · D0






¯ w − w
¯ w
·
G(c0 + ( ¯ w − w)(1 − τ1)) − G(c0)
λ( ¯ w − w)(1 − τ1)
=




where we have used the deﬁnition ge
0 in the last equality. 
29B Appendix: Extensions
B.1 Uniform Rationing
As discussed, our previous results are derived under the key assumption of eﬃcient rationing,
the situation most favorable to the minimum wage. Below we brieﬂy explore how results
change if we adopt the polar opposite “uniform rationing” assumption whereby unemployment
is distributed across workers independently of surplus.35
• Case with no Taxes
In the case of uniform rationing with no taxes, the government chooses ¯ w to maximize:













The second term in equation (17) reﬂects the notion that all workers with work costs
θ ∈ (0, ¯ w) have the same probability of being employed, but that the total number of low
skilled workers is given by the demand function D1( ¯ w).
Suppose that ¯ w is increased by d ¯ w under the “uniform rationing” scenario. The redistribu-
tive value of introducing a small minimum wage d ¯ w remains the same: T = [g1 − g2]h1d ¯ w.
The minimum wage reduces employment through a demand eﬀect by dh1 = −η1h1d ¯ w/ ¯ w.
However, the minimum wage will induce workers with cost of work θ ∈ ( ¯ w, ¯ w + d ¯ w) to look
for a job as well. There are e1hS
1d ¯ w/ ¯ w such workers where hS
1 = h1
0P1( ¯ w) is the number of
low skilled individuals willing to work for wage ¯ w. Under eﬃcient rationing, those marginal
workers would stay out of work. Under uniform rationing, however, a fraction h1/hS
1 of those
new workers will join the labor force and will displace other workers as unemployment is
distributed uniformly. That excess labor supply creates involuntary unemployment. As in-
voluntary unemployment is distributed uniformly across all low skilled workers, the average
welfare cost per displaced worker is
R ¯ w
0 [G( ¯ w − θ) − G(0)]p1(θ)dθ/P1( ¯ w). The number of dis-
placed workers is h1(e1 + η1)d ¯ w/ ¯ w. Thus, the welfare loss due to involuntary unemployment
is equal to U = −h1(d ¯ w/ ¯ w)(e1 +η1)
R ¯ w
0 [G( ¯ w −θ)−G(0)]p1(θ)dθ/P1( ¯ w). At the optimum, we
35“Uniform rationing” amounts to assuming that unemployment strikes randomly and that Coasian re-trading
is prohibitively expensive and hence does not happen at all.
30have U + T = 0 which implies
Z ¯ w
0
[G( ¯ w − θ) − G(0)]p1(θ)dθ
¯ wP1( ¯ w)
· (e1 + η1) = g1 − g2. (18)
If at ¯ w = w∗
1, the left-hand-side is smaller than the right-hand-side of (18), then a minimum
wage is desirable (and conversely for the alternative case). The key point is that a minimum
wage is not necessarily desirable under “uniform rationing.”
We can introduce a welfare weight on employment losses deﬁned as gu
0 =
R ¯ w
0 [G( ¯ w − θ) −
G(0)]p1(θ)dθ/
R ¯ w
0 ( ¯ w − θ)p1(θ)dθ. If we assume that the supply elasticity e1 is constant, then
P1(θ) = C ·θe1 and hence
R ¯ w









This equation is an implicit formula for the optimal minimum wage. Presumably, the welfare
weight ratio (g1 − g2)/gu
0 is decreasing with ¯ w. Formula (19) implies that the minimum wage
should be increased up to the point where the welfare weight ratio is equal to the elasticity
ratio (e1 +η1)/(1+e1). Obviously, if at ¯ w = w∗
1, the welfare weight ratio is already below the
elasticity ratio, then no minimum wage is desirable. Note that the elasticity ratio is increasing
in η1 and, hence, the optimum minimum wage is decreasing in η1. If gu
0 ≥ g1,36 equation (19)
implies that the right-hand-side is less than one, and a minimum wage will only be desirable
if η1 < 1.
When η1 < 1, the elasticity ratio increases with e1. This implies that the optimum mini-
mum wage is decreasing in e1. This contrasts with our results under eﬃcient rationing and can
be understood as follows: a large supply elasticity makes unemployment less costly as workers
have lower surplus from working on average, but a large supply elasticity induces more for-
merly out of work individuals to look for jobs, displacing workers with higher surpluses (which
is ineﬃcient). When η1 < 1, the latter eﬀect is stronger than the former eﬀect explaining why
the minimum wage decreases with e1.37
Empirically, we would expect rationing in practice to be in-between eﬃcient rationing and
uniform rationing. It is very easy to extend the model to a mixed situation where a fraction
36For example, this holds for constant supply elasticity e1 and constant risk aversion functions G(.).
37Note also that, with uniform rationing, and if workers can smooth consumption across unemployment spells,
then we have g
u
0 = g1. The standard result about the pivotal η1 = 1 can be seen as a particular case of (19) when
e1 = 0 (no supply elasticity), g2 = 0 (no value assigned to high skilled workers), and g
u
0 = g1 (unemployment
spells are shared and consumption is smoothed).
31δ of unemployment strikes uniformly while a fraction 1 − δ of the unemployment is eﬃciently
allocated. In that case, the formula for the optimum minimum wage is a straight average of
(7) and (19), namely g1−g2 = (1−δ)ge
0η1( ¯ w−w)/ ¯ w+δgu
0(η1+e1)/(η1+e1). This shows that
our eﬃcient rationing results are robust to the introduction of a little bit of uniform rationing.
• Case with Optimal Taxes
In the case with taxes, the government chooses, c0,c1,c2, and ¯ w to maximize:












subject to the standard budget constraint and the fact that demand for labor is competitively
set. The second term in Equation (20) reﬂects the notion that all workers with work costs
θ ∈ (0,c1 −c0) have the same probability of being employed, but that the total number of low
skilled workers is given by the demand function D1( ¯ w). The ﬁrst order condition with respect
to c0 (keeping c1 −c0,c2 −c0, ¯ w constant) implies the standard result h0g0 +h1g1 +h2g2 = 1.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to c2 leads to the standard optimal tax formula for τ2,


















0 [G(c1 − θ) − G(c0)]p1(θ)dθ/(λ ·
R c1−c0
0 (c1 − c0 − θ)p1(θ)dθ) is the welfare
weight on (marginal) unemployment losses.
















Therefore and strikingly, combining those two ﬁrst order conditions, we ﬁnd that the optimal
tax formula for τ1 in the presence of the optimal minimum wage is the same as with no minimum
wage, namely τ1/(1 − τ1) = (1 − g1)/e1. Intuitively and following the derivation from Figure
2b, this can be understood as follows: suppose c1 is increased by dc1, and at the same time
the minimum wage ¯ w is reduced by d ¯ w such that dc1 · p1/P1 = d ¯ w · D0
1( ¯ w)/D1. In that case,
a fraction D1/P1 of those p1dc1 workers willing to join the labor force because of dc1 can do
so and hence the ﬁscal eﬀect of the reform is (T1 − T0)p1dc1 · D1/P1 = D1dc1 · e1 · τ1/(1 − τ1)
and the standard formula goes through. We can then obtain the following proposition:
32Proposition 5 With optimal taxes/transfers and uniform rationing, if the welfare weight on
unemployment losses is larger than the welfare weight on low skilled workers (gu
0 ≥ g1) and
the supply elasticity e1 is constant, then a minimum wage is not desirable.
Proof: Under the assumption of a constant e1 and if a binding minimum wage, the integral
term in the right-hand-side of (21) is equal to 1/(1 + e1) and hence (21) can be rewritten as
(g1 − 1)/e1 = gu
0/(1 + e1). However, (g1 − 1)/e1 < g1/(1 + e1) ≤ gu
0/(1 + e1), where the ﬁrst
inequality follows from that fact that g1 < 1 + e1 (as τ1 = (1 − g1)/(1 − g1 + e1))38 and the
second inequality from our assumption that g1 ≤ gu
0. This creates a contradiction showing
that the minimum wage cannot be binding. 
As in the case with no taxes, it is easy to extend the model to a mixed situation where a
fraction δ of unemployment strikes uniformly, while a fraction 1 − δ of the unemployment is
eﬃciently allocated. In particular, a minimum is desirable if and only if g1 > 1+δgu
0e1/(1+e1)
at the tax optimum with no minimum wage. When a minimum wage is desirable, at the
optimum we have, g1 = 1+δgu
0e1/(1+e1) and −τ1/(1−τ1) = δgu
0/(1+e1)+(1−δ)ge
0( ¯ w−w)/ ¯ w.
This shows that our results under eﬃcient rationing are also robust to the introduction of a
little bit of uniform rationing (small δ) in the case with optimal taxes.
B.2 General Labor Supply Function
We consider a general model with I occupations (instead of 2) and a general production
function.39 Most importantly, the model allows for any labor supply responses, instead of only
considering the extensive margin (as discussed previously).
• Model and Optimal Taxation
The model we use is the general occupation model described in the appendix of Saez (2002)
and Saez (2004). There are I + 1 occupations, paying wages w0 = 0,w1,..,wI. Occupation 0
denotes unemployment. There is a constant return to scale production function F(h1,..,hI)
so that wi = ∂F/∂hi. We assume that in equilibrium, occupations are ordered so that 0 <
w1 < .. < wI. Each individual is characterized by a cost parameter θ = (θ0 = 0,θ1,..,θI),
38If g1 > 1 + e1, then reducing τ1 is strictly desirable which cannot happen at the optimum.
39Introducing a capital input would also be possible as long as we assume that returns on capital can be
taxed at a speciﬁc rate τK. Similarly, pure proﬁts can also be introduced as long as the government can tax
them away fully.
33which describes the labor supply cost for the individual to work in each occupation i = 1,..,I.
By assumption, being out of work is costless. We assume that θ is distributed according to a
measure ν(θ) on Θ, with total population normalized to one.
The government can apply a general income tax and transfer system T = (T0,..,TI). We
denote by ci = wi − Ti the disposable income (after taxes/transfers) in occupation i. An
individual with cost θ picks the occupation i which maximizes cj − θj for j = 0,..,I. Hence,
the set Θ is partitioned into I + 1 subsets Θ0,..,ΘI so that individuals with θ ∈ Θi choose
occupation i. We denote by hi = ν(Θi) the fraction of individuals in occupation i. The supply
functions are functions of c = (c0,..,cI) and are denoted by hi(c0,..,cI). We assume that θ
is distributed smoothly across individuals so that the supply functions hi are continuously
diﬀerentiable. This is a fully general supply model with no income eﬀects. The participation
model from our previous section is a special case of this model. Similarly, the intensive labor
supply of Mirrlees (1971) can be represented in this discrete model by assuming that individuals
of “type i” can work in job i − 1 at no cost or work in job i at cost θi > 0 (see Saez, 2002 for
details).
Abstracting ﬁrst from the minimum wage, the government chooses c = (c0,..,cI) in order to
maximize: SW =
R
θ∈Θ G(ci−θi)dν(θ) subject to the budget constraint:
PI
j=0(wj−cj)·hj(c) ≥
0. G(.) is increasing and concave, and where index i inside in integral for SW denotes the
utility maximizing job choice of individual θ. We denote again by λ the multiplier of the
budget constraint.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to ci is simply:







where gi is the average social marginal welfare weight in occupation i, deﬁned as gi =
R
θ∈Θi G0(ci − θi)dν(θ)/(λ · hi).
The derivation is straightforward once one recognizes: (1) the welfare eﬀect of a small increase
dci due to switching jobs or behavioral responses is zero (because of a standard envelope
theorem argument) and (2) the wage changes dw1,..,dwI due to dci have no ﬁscal consequence
due to the no-proﬁt condition F = w1h1+..+wIhI, which implies that h1dw1+..+hIdwI = 0.
The no income eﬀects assumption implies
PI
j=0 gi · hi = 1. This can be obtained by
increasing every ci by dc uniformly. This generates no behavioral responses and hence the
34ﬁscal cost dc must be equal to the welfare gain dc ·
P
j hjgj. This implies that the average of
gi is one.
• Desirability of Minimum Wage Rationing
We can generalize Proposition 3 as follows: under eﬃcient rationing, if g1 > 1 at the tax
optimum, introducing a minimum wage is desirable.
The proof remains the same: starting from the tax optimum with no minimum wage,
setting ¯ w = w1 and increasing c1 improves social welfare when g1 > 1 without triggering
any behavioral response because those who would like to move to occupation 1 cannot do so
because of the minimum wage rationing. The eﬃcient rationing assumption also means those
already in occupation 1 are not displaced.
Theoretically, the occupation model can be seen as a generalized Diamond-Mirrlees optimal
tax model, which inherits most of the structure and properties of that model. In particular,
the analysis of minimum wages parallels the theory of rationing in second-best optimal tax
models developed by Guesnerie (1981) and Guesnerie and Roberts (1984). Following Samuel-









= gi − 1. (24)
The left-hand-side measures the percentage change in hi created by the tax system (which
changes cj from wj to wj − Tj). Hence, if gi > 1 (gi < 1), the optimal tax system encourages
(discourages) the supply of labor in occupation i. Therefore, the optimal tax system (absent a
minimum wage) subsidizes goods going to disadvantaged individuals (here low skilled work).
As a result, low skilled work is socially over-supplied at the second best tax optimum. It is
then socially desirable to ration subsidized low skill labor using a minimum wage.40
The “full redistribution to minimum wage workers” result of Proposition (3) also extends
to this general model. At the joint tax and minimum wage optimum, the optimum minimum
wage ¯ w covers occupations i = 1,..,i∗ (we assumed occupations were ordered). Thus those
40In the (discrete) intensive labor supply, the tax rate between occupation 0 (no work) and occupation 1
(lowest paid occupation) is positive (Saez, 2002) as in the Mirrlees continuous model. Nevertheless, it is still
the case that low skilled work is over-encouraged by the tax system because there are more individuals who shift
from occupation 2 to occupation 1 because of taxes than individuals who shift from occupation 1 to occupation
0.
35occupations pay the same wage ¯ w. As a result, the government can no longer distinguish across
occupations and is forced to tax (or subsidize) them uniformly, making c1 = .. = ci∗ = ¯ c. We
denote by ¯ T = ¯ w − ¯ c the net tax on minimum wage workers.
Again, increasing ¯ c does not produce any behavioral labor supply response (as occupations
1,..,i∗ are rationed by the minimum wage). Hence, the government should increase ¯ c up to
the point that ¯ g = 1 where ¯ g = (h1g1+..+hi∗gi∗)/(h1+..+hi∗) is the average social marginal
welfare weight on minimum wage workers.
• Many Consumption Goods and Production Eﬃciency
It is also possible to extend the tax model to a situation with many goods. In that context,
we can show that the standard theorems of public ﬁnance (namely, the production eﬃciency
theorem of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and the no commodity taxation result of Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1976)) carry over to the model with optimal minimum wage with taxes/transfers.
The production eﬃciency theorem implies that at the joint minimum wage and tax opti-
mum there should be production eﬃciency: producers should maximize proﬁts using pre-tax
prices for labor inputs and consumption outputs. This result is trivial to verify in the two
skill model and remains true with many labor inputs and many consumption goods. As is well
known, the production eﬃciency result implies that there should be no tariﬀs in the context
of an open economy. This important result also applies when the government uses a minimum
wage optimally.
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) suggests that, if utility functions are separable between con-
sumption goods and labor costs and the sub-utility of consumption is homogenous across all
consumers, then the optimum tax/minimum wage system should tax labor only and not im-
pose any diﬀerentiated taxes on consumption goods. This result also carries over to the joint
tax and minimum wage optimum.
B.3 Income Eﬀects
In order to introduce income eﬀects in the two-skill model used in the text, we can deﬁne
individual utility as u(c) − θ · l where u(.) is increasing and concave. Thus, an individual of
skill i works if and only if θ ≤ u(ci) − u(c0). Denoting ui = u(ci), for i = 0,1,2, the labor
36supply function becomes hi = h0
i · Pi(ui − u0). We can again evaluate social welfare as:
SW = (1 − h1 − h2)G(u0) + h0
1
Z




G(u2 − θ)p2(θ)dθ, (25)
where G(.) is a concave and increasing transformation. Note that (25) is identical to social
welfare with no income eﬀects once ci substituted by ui.
Let us denote again by λ the multiplier of the government budget constraint h0c0 +h1c1 +
h2c2 ≤ h1w1 + h2w2 which can be rewritten as:
h0u−1(u0) + h1u−1(u1) + h2u−1(u2) ≤ h1w1 + h2w2.
We deﬁne social marginal welfare weights as: g0 = G0(u0)u0(c0)/λ and gi =
R
G0(ui−θ)pi(θ)dθ·
u0(ci)/λ for i = 1,2.
With no minimum wage, the government chooses c0,c1,c2 (or equivalently u0,u1,u2) to





G0(u1 − θ)p1dθ + h0
1
Z






which can be rewritten as:
˜ h0g0 + ˜ h1g1 + ˜ h2g2 = 1,
where ˜ hi = (hi/u0(ci))/(
P
j hj/u0(cj)) > 0 can be interpreted as occupation shares re-normalized
by the marginal utility of consumption. Using those weights, the social marginal weights again
gi average to one.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to ui leads to the usual optimal tax formula τi/(1−
τi) = (1 − gi)/ei where the supply elasticity is deﬁned as ei = [(ci − c0)/hi]∂hi/∂ci|c0 =
(ci − c0)u0(ci) · pi(ui − u0)/Pi(ui − u0).
Again, we can show a minimum wage is desirable if g1 > 1 at the tax optimum. At the joint
minimum wage and tax optimum, we have ˜ h0g0 + ˜ h1g1 + ˜ h2g2 = 1, g1 = 1, τ2/(1 − τ2) = (1 −
g2)/e2. Furthermore, the ﬁrst order condition in ¯ w takes a similar form [G(u1−¯ θ)−G(u0)]/λ =
−w1·τ1 < 0 (where ¯ θ is the cost of work of the marginal worker). Hence, Proposition 4 showing
that τ1 > 0 along with a binding minimum wage is Pareto dominated applies to the case with
income eﬀects as well.
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Figure 1. Minimum Wage with no Taxes and Transfers 
Panel a displays the desirability of introducing a small minimum wage starting from the competitive 
equilibrium. A small minimum wage creates a first order transfer to low skilled workers from other factors 
and a second order welfare low due to involuntary unemployment (under the key assumption of uniform 
rationing). 
Panel b displays the trade-off for setting the optimal minimum wage. Increasing the minimum wage 
slightly generates a first order transfer to low skilled workers from other factors and a first order loss due to 


































Endogenous wages do not 
affect optimal formula as
h1dw1+h2dw2=0 (no profits)
and tax=(w1-c1) h1+(w2-c2) h2
b. Assuming Endogenous Wages
 
Figure 2. Optimal Income Tax Derivation (with no minimum wage) 
Panel a displays the trade-offs involved when increasing c1 by dc1 and assuming that wage rates remain 
fixed. At the optimum, the net welfare effect of dc1 must equal the fiscal loss due to the behavioral 
response. We assume that g1>1 so that the net welfare effect is positive. 
Panel b shows that the derivation remains valid with endogenous wages as the fiscal effects due to changes 

















With min wage set at w1, 
dc1>0 does not affect labor 




Figure 3. Desirability of a Minimum Wage under Optimal Taxes 
The Figure shows that, starting from the tax optimum with no taxes (derived on Figure 2), introducing a 











Unemployment decreases: dh1>0 Æ
Welfare effect > 0
Fiscal effect: τ1w1 dh1>0
Reduce w while keeping c1, c2 constant:
Fiscal effect >0 and Welfare effect >0
No direct fiscal effect of dw, dw2 as
h1dw+h2dw2=0 (no profits)
and tax=(w-c1) h1+(w2-c2) h2
 
Figure 4. Pareto Improving Policy when τ1>0 and the minimum wage binds 
The Figure starts from a situation with a positive tax rate on low skilled work (τ1>0) along with a binding 
minimum wage creating involuntary unemployment. From that situation, consider lowering the minimum 
wage while keeping c0, c1, and c2 constant. This reform reduces involuntary unemployment, hence 
increasing welfare of the newly employed and increasing tax revenue as the newly employed pay higher 






















 σ=0.5 σ=0.5 σ=0.5 σ=0.25 σ=0.5 σ=1
e1=0.25 e1=0.5 e1=1 e1=0.5 e1=0.5 e1=0.5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Optimum Minimum Wage with no taxes and transfers
A1. Case γ=1
Minimum Wage / Market Wage 1.12 1.21 1.34 1.44 1.21 1.07
Unemployment Rate 7.6% 16.8% 39.8% 24.8% 16.8% 9.2%
A2. Case γ=3
Minimum Wage / Market Wage 1.03 1.08 1.17 1.18 1.08 1.03
Unemployment Rate 2.3% 6.9% 20.1% 10.9% 6.9% 3.8%
A3. Case γ=0.5
Minimum Wage / Market Wage 1.11 1.19 1.29 1.41 1.19 1.06
Unemployment Rate 6.9% 15.0% 34.9% 23.1% 15.0% 8.1%
B. Optimum Minimum Wage with exogenous taxes (uniform tax rate τ=0.35)
B1. Case γ=1
Minimum Wage / Market Wage 1.00 1.01 1.04 1.13 1.01 1.00
Unemployment Rate 0.0% 0.5% 5.5% 8.0% 0.5% 0.0%
Notes: The table reports the minimum wage (relative to market wage rate w* 1) and the induced unemployment rate
among the low skilled as a function of the elasticity of substitution  σ between low and high skilled labor
in production, the elasticity of labor supply of low skilled workers e 1 (the high skilled labor supply elasticity
e2=0.25 in all cases), and the risk aversion γ of the social welfare function. 
The production function is CES with elasticity of substitution γ, calibrated so that market equilibrium with
no minimum wage is (w*1,w*2)=(1,3). The supply functions are calibrated so that (h* 0,h*1,h*2)=(.2,.2,.6)
The social welfare function is such that G(u)=(u+0.5)
1-γ/(1-γ).
Table 1: Optimal Minimum Wage with No Taxes or Fixed Taxesσ=0.5 σ=0.5 σ=0.5 σ=0.25 σ=0.5 σ=1
e1=0.25 e1=0.5 e1=1 e1=0.5 e1=0.5 e1=0.5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Case γ=1
A1. Optimal Tax Rates with no Minimum Wage
Tax rate on low skilled workers τ1 -9.0% -20.7% -20.1% -25.7% -20.7% -16.6%
Tax rate on high skilled workers τ2 45.4% 46.2% 47.6% 47.0% 46.2% 45.4%
A2. Optimal Tax Rates and optimal Minimum Wage
Tax rate on low skilled workers τ1 -13.1% -45.0% -98.4% -56.4% -45.0% -35.6%
Tax rate on high skilled workers τ2 45.2% 44.9% 44.2% 45.5% 44.9% 44.3%
Minimum Wage / Market Wage 1.02 1.11 1.31 1.20 1.11 1.06
Unemployment Rate 1.6% 11.2% 52.1% 13.2% 11.2% 9.3%
B. Case γ=3
B1. Optimal Tax Rates with no Minimum Wage
Tax rate on low skilled workers τ1 28.6% 10.2% -7.6% 5.3% 10.2% 14.1%
Tax rate on high skilled workers τ2 64.0% 64.2% 64.7% 64.6% 64.2% 63.8%
B2. Optimal Tax Rates and optimal Minimum Wage
Tax rate on low skilled workers τ1 28.6% 10.2% -15.5% 5.3% 10.2% 14.1%
Tax rate on high skilled workers τ2 64.0% 64.2% 64.4% 64.6% 64.2% 63.8%
Minimum Wage / Market Wage 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.00
Unemployment Rate 0.0% 0.0% 6.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
C. Case γ=0.5
C1. Optimal Tax Rates with no Minimum Wage
Tax rate on low skilled workers τ1 -21.9% -23.3% -16.6% -25.9% -23.3% -17.8%
Tax rate on high skilled workers τ2 32.4% 33.6% 35.2% 34.4% 33.6% 32.0%
C2. Optimal Tax Rates and optimal Minimum Wage
Tax rate on low skilled workers τ1 -41.0% -81.3% -153.3% -93.2% -81.3% -34.1%
Tax rate on high skilled workers τ2 31.3% 30.7% 29.1% 31.5% 30.7% 31.1%
Minimum Wage / Market Wage 1.08 1.21 1.49 1.35 1.21 1.04
Unemployment Rate 5.5% 21.9% 91.5% 23.8% 21.9% 4.7%
Notes: The table reports optimal tax rates (on low and high skilled) with no minimum wage and
the joint optimal tax rates and minimum wage (relative to market wage rate w*1) and the induced unemployment rate
among the low skilled as a function of the elasticity of substitution σ between low and high skilled labor
in production, the elasticity of labor supply of low skilled workers e1 (the high skilled labor supply elasticity
e2=0.25 in all cases), and the risk aversion γ of the social welfare function. 
The production function is CES with elasticity of substitution γ, calibrated so that market equilibrium with
no minimum wage is (w*1,w*2)=(1,3). The supply functions are calibrated so that (h*0,h*1,h*2)=(.2,.2,.6)
The social welfare function is such that G(u)=(u+0.5)
1-γ/(1-γ).
Table 2: Optimal Minimum Wage with Optimal Taxes